Dynamic Dynamo De-Magnetized as Dominic Departs
In the next installment of my End of Season analyses here’s my look at the Houston Dynamo.
Last week I offered my End of Season analysis on the Chicago Fire (found here:) Candle Burned at Both Ends.
Previous to that I offered up my two part series on the Portland Timbers here (Defense) and here (Attacking).
This is the second article I’ve offered up on Houston this year – my earlier article can be found here: Disheveled Defense has Dominic’s Dynamo in Disarray.
After working through the info I’ll offer my thoughts, for consideration, on some changes that may need to happen to make this team more competitive.
Like every installment I’ll lead with this Diagram – my Composite Possession with Purpose (CPWP) Index:
If you see a pattern in my approach this year – you’re right – I’ll be working from worst to first excluding the eye-sore – Chivas USA. No point in my view – Wilbur Cabrera no doubt did the best job he could but since the organization is toast it’s best this black-eye of the MLS Franchise is laid to rest as quickly as possible.
Note that Houston (HDFC) finished third bottom in the Composite Index – pretty much meaning that both their attacking and defending team performance was weak.
The correlation (R2) of this Index to average points earned in MLS is .85.
Now for the Grist… points per game both home and away for Houston this year.
On the Road Houston averaged .65 Points per Game (PPG) 4th worst in MLS – at home 1.65 PPG 10th best in MLS.
Overall – Houston averaged 1.15 PPG – 6th worst in MLS.
So from a team performance standpoint – dead on average when it came to performing at home this year – the killer, in putting them near bottom, was their road performance.
When looking into the team performance indicators of PWP I’ll make it a special point to peel back home and away outputs. For now they had eight wins at home with three wins on the road.
It would appear that their inability to get a draw on the road was a stumbling block – just 2 draws to go with three wins – otherwise they lost 12 road games this year…
In those 12 road losses they scored just four goals, in their two road draws – they didn’t score any goals.
Even more pear-shaped is that four of their 12 goals, on the road, came in one game against Chivas USA! They simply didn’t get results on the road!
Can you say new strikers for next year?
Perhaps – but it’s not all about just striking the ball, there’s passing accuracy, penetration, and as things are beginning to show, patience…
Bottom line here, they really couldn’t score or win on the road…
Team Performance – first up – given their inability to score goals on the road – Attacking PWP:
Given just four goals scored in their 12 losses and only .71 Goals per Game, on the road as a whole – it shouldn’t be surprising that they fell that low in the Attacking PWP Index. Kind of makes you wonder about San Jose (2nd worst) and them bringing on Dominic Kinnear to turn that attacking ship around?!?
However viewed there’s six team performance indicators that make up this Index so were they all bad, across the board, or just in finishing?
All told – 48.95% – (9th highest) with Home possession 50.61% and Road possession 47.34%.
Not enough information to really pick out if their home and road styles were different – but enough information to warrant a closer look at volume both inside and outside the final third.
The overall volume of passes offered up at home was 417 per game – while on the road 397 per game – about 20 passes per game fewer.
That 20 passes per game more, at Home, only translated to 6 more passes per game in the Attacking Final Third (117 at home vs 111 on the road).
Again – not a great difference so more data is needed.
All told – 76.54% – (11th highest) with Home accuracy 77.41% and Road accuracy 75.68%.
Overall their passing accuracy appeared to suffer on the road versus at home; but neither were particularly good compared to the rest of MLS.
We already know their volume of passes decreased on the road as well – so as their volume decreased their accuracy decreased.
That doesn’t usually follow but I think we saw that trait with Chicago as well – as volume decreased accuracy decreased…
For the Portland Timbers the opposite was true – as volume decreased accuracy increased.
So that relationship seems pretty pear-shaped to me…
I suppose there can be any number of reasons why this might occur – for me, I’d offer at least one observation – with decreased passing and decreased possession they may have been playing more difficult (longer) passes given less control of the game; i.e – showing less patience.
Penetration per Possession:
All told – 23.82% (5th highest) with Home penetration 24.38% and Road penetration 23.25%
For the most part, in doing this analysis for two years now – a higher percentage of penetration per possession is not that good with a lower passing accuracy percentage.
What that higher number appears to indicate is less patience (with lower overall passing accuracy) and with that less patience in penetration their is usually a corresponding increase in the volume of shots – but the accuracy of those shots is usually lower.
Which then translates to fewer shots on goal and fewer goals scored.
For now, I’d offer that Houston attempted to penetrate with more frequency compared to having less possession – some might say this indicates a more direct attacking style as well.
When looking at the percentage of passes completed, in the Final Third, the Dynamo were accurate 62.44% of the time on the road (7th worst), 67.43% at home (7th best) and 64.94% overall.
Given the lower passing accuracy, and lower volume, as we know from earlier, I’d offer the Dynamo looked to play more direct on the road, and slightly less direct at home.
Put another way (perhaps?) – they were less patient on the road than at home.
Shots Taken per Penetrating Possession:
All told – 18.83% (5th highest) with Home at 19.72% and Road at 17.93%
So 5th highest in both penetrating possession and shots taken per penetration.
As noted above then, the first two trends match other low performers – more penetration usually means more shots per penetration when passing accuracy is on the lower end of the scale.
What’s also interesting is that these last two indicators were lower for Road games than Home games.
And, at the same time, Home games saw the Dynamo more accurate in their passing.
Meaning, it’s likely there is more to their road attacking weakness than strikers; the question taking shape for me do those weaknesses also include lack of good midfielders, or worse yet, a completely pear-shaped away game tactical style?
Shots on Goal per Shots Taken:
We already know that the magic number for most teams, to win in the top leagues, is at least 5-6 Shots on Goal; (read here if not convinced).
For Houston they averaged 33.05% (2nd worst) in this category with Home 34.80% and Road 31.30%.
So the pattern of, less percentages from gaining possession, on-wards, means less percentages all the way through when the Dynamo are on the Road, compared to Home.
And with that percentage being 2nd worst in MLS it’s worthy to check what the average volumes are as well.
Shots Taken (13.29 – Home = 14.49 – Road = 11.65) 10th best overall.
Shots on Goal (4.53 – Home = 5.18 – Road = 3.88) 12th best overall.
Let’s not forget they won eight games at home – so that target of 5.18 seems reasonable.
A couple of things here – if it’s just strikers then chances are the target of 5.18 shots on goal at home is not reached and with 3.88 shots on goal on the road as well, it’s pretty likely that the – so I’d offer it’s more than just strikers.
Bottom line here; before looking at the Goals Scored I’d offer that the consistency in poor passing accuracy, overzealous approach in penetration and shot creation is down to poor midfield play and poor team tactics as opposed to just weaknesses in strikers.
Goals Scored per Shots on Goal:
With over 5.18 Shots on Goal per game at Home the Dynamo should have averaged over 2.00 goals per game – but they didn’t.
So for me that does mean strikers are also accountable for the poor attacking performance.
All told their team performance percentage was 22.14% – the worst in MLS. Home was 30.19% (8th worst) and Road was 14.08% – a full 16% points below the league average.
They not only had poor performance when it came to striking (even at home their overall performance was below average) they were horrendous on the road.
Team road performance percentages (REGULARLY) were lower (in percentage and by volume) across the board, in every single category.
Clearly pointing, in my opinion, to a tactical strategy that was wrong – never-mind the perceived or real weaknesses in their strikers.
If Dominic Kinnear thinks he’s going to be able to take a failed tactical attacking road strategy, in the East, and expect to have it win out West (in a far tougher conference) he needs to rethink.
And San Jose really need to consider what investments will be needed to have Dominic Kinnear transform the 2nd worst attacking team in MLS, when their new Head Coach just completed a year in Houston where his tactical approach led to the third worst attacking team performance in MLS.
Now with those brutal thoughts out of the way for Attack – here’s how the Dynamo performed in Defending PWP:
Not quite as ugly on the defending side of the pitch – but still 6th worst, overall, in MLS.
Opponent Possession Percentage:
All told – 51.02% – we already know based upon their attacking possession percentage the opponent possessed the ball more often than the Dynamo.
That’s not a bad thing for some teams – New England, Vancouver, DC United, and FC Dallas all made the playoffs where the opponent possessed the ball more than they did.
In that, I’d offer the rubber will meet the road a bit later as we dig in on the defensive end.
Opponent Passing Accuracy:
All told 78.47% (4th highest) with Home 77.34% and Road 79.59%.
Not much to draw on without looking into some volumes – so Total Passes faced was 426.03 per game; 9th fewest in MLS – at Home opponents passed 401 times per game – versus when on the road – that number increased by almost 50 passes per game (448.94).
Pretty much indicating to me the Dynamo ceded possession as well as a considerably higher number of overall passes; especially when facing opponents on the road.
Still not enough to draw a conclusion, one way or the other, about weaker play or tactics.
Opponent Penetration per Possession:
All told – 22.19% (12th best) with Home 20.78% and Road 23.59%.
When playing on the Road the opponents (at home) penetrated roughly 3% more of the time than visiting Houston.
The percentage of passing within and into the Houston defending final third was 67.26% on the road and 62.68% at home.
More penetration by opponents when Houston played on the road and better accuracy for the opponents as well.
In considering the opponent volumes, the average number of passes, within and into the defending final third, was 112.65 per game.
Opponents visiting Houston averaged 102 per game. compared to 122.63 when Houston visited them.
An increase in volume by nearly 20 passes per game when on the road.
So far, that means both the volume and accuracy of the opponent, when entertaining Houston got better the closer they got to the Houston goal.
With that I’d expect Shots Taken per Penetrating Possession and Shots on Goals percentages to drop somewhat – reinforcing that as teams did gain penetration they were more likely to show more patience in shots taken – resulting in increased goals scored.
However viewed, I’d offer that the tactics on the road, against the opponent, were not the same as those employed at home. By volume alone, I’d offer that Houston played slightly higher up the pitch (defensively) at home, and slightly deeper on the road. My rationale for that comes after doing my analysis on Philadelphia and Portland this year – both teams showed these trends, in volume, and percentages, when playing deeper versus more shallow.
Opponent Shots Taken per Penetrating Possession:
All told 19.91% (4th worst) with Home 22.16% (2nd worst) and Road 17.67% (13th worst).
In other words the opponent’s were taking more shots per penetrating possession than opponents against other teams.
What’s interesting is that the percentage for opponents, when Houston played them on the road, dropped – in other words the opponents took fewer shots per penetrating possession.
This is an indicator that the opponents were more frugal with their shot selection – meaning, usually, they sought more time and space in order to increase the end results – accuracy in having shots on goal – score goals.
The higher percentage at Home could mean that the Dynamo were more likely to hurry their opponent into taking shots – with eight wins at home that shouldn’t be surprising.
However viewed, the trends indicating a different tactical approach, given opponent outputs, still continues to show itself in the data.
Opponent Shots on Goal per Shots Taken:
All told 34.90% (6th best) with Home 34.25% and Road 35.55%.
Their average volume of shots on goal, against, is 5th highest in MLS and the average Goals Against was 1.58 (6th highest in MLS).
So regardless of what tactic was employed the opponent’s were finding ways to put their shots on goal.
When on the road, the opponent averages 1.81 goals against Houston – 3rd worst (highest) in MLS.
Meaning, even with decreased shots taken (by percentage) and decreased shots on goal (by percentage) the opponents were pretty accurate.
So in the case of Houston, a perceived deeper line in defending (in away games) did not reduce goals against – it increased goals against.
So the tactic successfully employed by both Philadelphia and Portland did not pan out for Houston.
This could mean any number of things but I’d offer at least two thoughts; 1) the defensive tactic on the road was the wrong defensive tactic (all year), and 2) adding both a central midfielder and left fullback did not heal the wounds, meaning more player personnel moves are likely when viewing the defending side of the pitch. And yes, I did take a look to see if there were differences in volume or percentage from game one to game 34 – I didn’t see any either viewing the total or just away/home games.
I’d offer the move to change Head Coaches was probably going to happen even if Dominic Kinnear didn’t show his intentions of moving to San Jose.
I’d also offer there could be at least 4-6 new starters for this team next year. At least one new striker, two new midfielders, two new defenders, plus, we already know, there will be a new Goal Keeper.
I’d also offer there are indicators showing that the overall tactical approach, on the road, was pear-shaped – if Dominic Kinnear expects to use that same approach in San Jose, without some minor upgrades in players, compared to this year, he may have issues.
And he certainly needs to reconsider what road attacking style he adopts as well – with San Jose being 2nd worst in these same categories, across the board, he may have major goal scoring issues.
Finally, some teams seemed to have improved their goals against by playing deeper – while with Houston that does not appear to be the case. What appears to work for some, might not work for others; it’s a funny game this is.
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