Tagged: Dominic Kinnear
Earthquakes, Shake, Rattle and Roll-Over
Not the best of seasons for San Jose this year – what started as a renewed vision for Mark Watson, this season, has now turned to a renewed vision for Dominic Kinnear next season.
Like Chicago Fire (Candle Burned at Both Ends) and Houston Dynamo (Dynamic Dynamo Demagnatized as Dominic Departs) I’ll be peeling back the good, bad and ugly for San Jose this season with the intent of identifying what positional changes might be needed to help this team get better.
As usual, to set the stage, here’s my Composite PWP Strategic Index for the end of 2014.
There’s San Jose (SJFC), sandwiched near bottom in-between Houston and Montreal.
Before digging into the what’s and why’s of my Possession with Purpose Family of Indices here’s the breakdown on the regular statistics that most people pay attention to; at least those who only focus on results:
All told just .88 Points Per Game (PPG); with Goals Per Game (GPG) at 1.03 and Goals Against Per Game (GAPG) at 1.47.
Not enough goals scored and clearly too many goals scored against. All told their Goal Differential (GD) was -.44 – 5th worst in MLS.
In Away games PPG was .53, GPG .82, GAPG 1.71 and GD -.88 (5th worst in MLS).
For Home games PPG was 1.24 (2nd worst), GPG 1.24, GAPG was 1.24 and GD was 0.00 (2nd worst in MLS).
All told San Jose were near bottom in every basic results driven statistic this year with the Away record (1-6-10) even worse than their paltry Home record (5-6-6).
And they are bringing in Dominic Kinnear? Well I suppose (3-2-12) in Away games and (8-4-5) is better for Home games, from a results perspective.
But how about overall team attacking and defending performance? And is there a light already shining that many may have missed?
Team Attacking (both home and away):
Notice that San Jose fall even lower in overall team attacking than either Chicago or Houston, two teams already evaluated.
If you read those reports you’ll know both were pretty poor in overall attacking. So if you’re a San Jose supporter brace yourself for some pretty ugly numbers.
Possession Percentage:
Overall 48.81% – almost middle of the road and on its own an indicator that won’t offer much given Playoff teams like FC Dallas, Vancouver, DC United, and New England all slid under 50%.
Is there a difference between away games and home games? In away games it was 47.40% vs at home 50.22%.
So IF any early conclusions might be drawn it’s this – they had a better record at home and they averaged more possession at home – is it reasonable to offer that the more possession this team has the better they are? We’ll see…
Passing Accuracy:
Overall 76.86% – dead on average (10th) compared to everyone else. Again, teams like FC Dallas, DC United, and New England fell below that number and they all made the playoffs.
In looking at away versus home games; away games 75.94% vs at home 77.78%; a bit higher at home than away – again the same question – does increased possession and increased passing accuracy help plot where San Jose is more successful?
Penetrating Possession:
Overall 21.92% – below average (7th worst). Only FC Dallas and DC United fell lower than San Jose.
In looking at away versus home games; in away games 21.93% vs at home 21.91%.
Here’s where the rubber begins to meet the road… notice that with less possession, and less passing accuracy in away games, the Earthquakes actually penetrated more into the opponents Defending Final Third.
This sort of pattern has shown itself with other teams – more often than not it leads to these observations – a more direct attacking style (get in as quickly as you can) and a less impatient approach as the team begins to work towards scoring goals.
In other words their shooting accuracy drops off, as does their goals scored.
Let’s see if this is the case with San Jose.
Shots Taken per penetrating possession:
Overall 16.46% – well below average (4th worst) (or best) depending on a few things – teams with higher passing accuracy usually have lower percentages here, in this case San Jose is on the cusp, if you will.
Their overall percentage seems to indicate more patience when it comes to taking shots – which in turn should mean a higher percentage of shots taken being on goal. That’s not the case though – they are 3rd worst in MLS when it comes to shots taken being on goal (33.93%).
So without knowing the exact locations of the shots taken I’d offer they need a stronger attacking system to generate more time and space to increase their shots on goal and goals scored.
As for away games; their percentage dropped down to 12.81% while at home it was 20.11%. That is a marked difference in percentage of shots taken per penetrating possession. It’s almost like Jekyll and Hyde.
Perhaps that is a big enough difference to say that their attack was so basic (simple) in away games, this past year, that they simply didn’t get that many shots off because they telegraphed what they were trying to do?
In other words they didn’t have enough creativity to generate better chances.
An indicator here may be their passing accuracy.
In the opponents Defending Final Third it was 60.72% for away games – 5th worst. So even though they offered 107 passes per game (10th best in MLS) they could only complete 65 of those passes.
And of those 65 passes completed, only eight of them ended up creating a shot taken! For me speaking to no time, no space, and/or simply no-one willing to take a shot even if a marginal amount of time and space did become available.
Shots on Goal per Shots Taken:
Overall 33.93% (3rd worst).
So not only did they take fewer shots per penetration (far fewer in away games) they were also less accurate than most when it came to putting those shots on goal.
Again, speaking to lack of time and space, and perhaps location too?
In away games 33.05% versus at home 34.81%.
In going back to the ‘more means more’ aspect of San Jose. More possession and better passing accuracy does mean more shots taken and it also means more shots on goal.
In looking at away games less means less – in other words less possession, less passing accuracy, means less shots taken per penetration and less shots on goal.
Not every team behaves like that – some do better with less than more. In considering this output pattern it’s not the same as Houston or Chicago – it’s different – which means the tactical approach is probably different as well. More to follow…
Goal Scored per Shots on Goal:
Overall 22.50% (2nd worst).
In tracking the ‘more means more and less means less’ the percentages for this indicator should be lower in away games and higher in home games.
It is – in away games it’s 20.88% (2nd worst) and for home games it’s 24.12% (still 2nd worst) but a better 2nd worst than the away game outputs!
Attacking summary:
More meant more for San Jose when at home and less meant less when on the road – but in both cases neither approach provided consistency in getting results.
In other words they didn’t have enough “more” to generate “more” and their less meant less…
All told I submit these attacking issues not only speak to San Jose needing better strikers – they also need better midfielders – those with greater vision, greater patience, but at the same time a wee bit more risk.
With all that offered about Attack – here’s the view from how well the opponents did against them in the same categories:
If there is a good news story here it should be defending – overall their team performance sees them as 9th best in DPWP.
Opponent Possession Percentage:
Overall 51.19% – as noted, possession alone is not an indicator of value without better understanding all the other key indicators to go with it.
In this case it’s pretty clear San Jose is not a possession based team away from home (52.60%) but they are at home – or at least they don’t cede possession (49.78%) for opponents when playing at home.
Opponent Passing Accuracy:
Overall 77.95% – opponents average accuracy is 8th best, against San Jose, in MLS.
In away games opponents average 79.81% (4th highest) and 76.10% when playing in San Jose (8th lowest).
So the Earthquakes cede possession on the road and they also cede a higher opponent passing accuracy – that higher possession and passing accuracy outside the Defending Final Third also translates to having the 5th highest opponent passing accuracy (67.83%) within and into the Defending Final Third.
For home games that opponent passing accuracy drops to 65.40%.
Before moving on – the volumes ceded are quite high as well.
Overall, San Jose opponents average 435 passes per game (9th highest) with 442 by the opponent in road games and 427 for opponents in home game.
As the opponent penetrates that volume equals 124 passes attempted (2nd highest) by opponents visiting San Jose and 124 when facing opponents on the road (5th highest).
So even though passing accuracy for the opponent isn’t that high – the volume, after finally gaining penetration is 2nd and 5th highest in MLS. More to follow on that…
Opponent Penetrating Possession:
Overall 24.60% (5th highest) with that percentage being 24.15% (7th highest) for opponents on the road and 25.05% (2nd highest) for opponents facing San Jose at home.
With that high percentage of penetration better defending teams will begin to show a higher number of shots taken against percentage but in turn a lower shots on goal percentage and, ultimately, a lower goals against percentage.
In other words the better defending teams leverage the reduced space to influence and reduce time and space for the opponent to strike the ball, put it on target and score the goals.
Shots Taken per Penetrating Possession:
Overall 19.71% (5th highest) with that percentage being 21.01% (3rd highest) for opponents on the road and 18.41% (8th highest) for opponents facing San Jose at home.
The pattern holds true so far… how about percentages of Shots on Goal per Shots Taken?
Shots on Goal per Shots Taken:
Overall 35.53% (9th lowest) – the trend continues – while on the road opponents average 36.12% (9th lowest) and 34.93% (8th lowest) when opponents face San Jose at home.
Goals Scored per Shots on Goal:
Overall 24.92% (2nd lowest in MLS) – again, the positive defending team performance continues to follow the pattern. In away games it’s 26.11% (3rd lowest) and at home it’s 23.73% (3rd lowest).
Bottom line here (the more to follow from earlier) is that the pattern of strong defending team performance matches that of some of the better teams in MLS – what hurts San Jose are not the overall percentages in execution – it’s the volume that they face in execution.
All told they face the most opponent shots per game (away) at 17.35, the 2nd most shots on goal (away) at 6.24 per game – but only the 9th highest goals against per game.
And when looking at how opponents do in San Jose, it’s 14.65 (highest) shots taken, 5.06 shots on goal (highest) but just 1.24 goals against (9th highest).
Defending summary:
The team percentages are indicative of a healthy defending tactical approach – in other words the performance indicators all point to a solid defending approach with one BIG exception.
Volume – while the percentages are good the volume of opponent activity is high – in other words – more volume up front against San Jose results in more volume at the back end…
BUT not as much volume as might be expected; especially when looking at the volume of shots taken and shots on goal – compared to the volume of goals scored. What that indicates to me is that the central part of the defending corps is strong – as is their goal keeper.
In Closing:
More means more is a trend and tendency of teams like Barcelona, FC Bayern, Real Madrid, Chelsea FC, LA Galaxy, and others – but that more is usually where the volumes exceed (in attack) 600 passes per game, 200 passes per game in the opponents defending final third, 16 shots per game, with 6-10 on goal and at least 2 goals scored.
More does not mean “more” when total passes hits just 400, penetrating passes hits just 100, shots taken hits 8 per game with 3-4 on goal and less than a goal scored!
The attacking tactical approach for San Jose was the wrong approach and had the wrong players – will Dominic Kinnear fix that?
Probably – but it may take at least five to six new starters with almost all of them being on the attacking side of the pitch.
On the defending side of the pitch – all indicators seem to point to a healthy relationship.
What is missing, however, is a solution that includes reducing the overall volume of attack by their opponents.
A reasonable way to reduce the volume of attack by your opponents is to increase your own volume of attack; i.e. reduce their possession by increasing your own possession.
But that’s tricky and it’s not always a sure-thing.
We’ve seen that ceding possession can be effective ways of improving defending team performance; perhaps that is the case when the overall technical ability of the defenders lacks compared to a group of four like San Jose have?
I’m not sure but it seems reasonable Dominic Kinnear will shape his team to his style – what will be intriguing is to see if ‘his’ style changes next year compared to how he worked his style this year.
Best, Chris
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Dynamic Dynamo De-Magnetized as Dominic Departs
In the next installment of my End of Season analyses here’s my look at the Houston Dynamo.
Last week I offered my End of Season analysis on the Chicago Fire (found here:) Candle Burned at Both Ends.
Previous to that I offered up my two part series on the Portland Timbers here (Defense) and here (Attacking).
This is the second article I’ve offered up on Houston this year – my earlier article can be found here: Disheveled Defense has Dominic’s Dynamo in Disarray.
After working through the info I’ll offer my thoughts, for consideration, on some changes that may need to happen to make this team more competitive.
Like every installment I’ll lead with this Diagram – my Composite Possession with Purpose (CPWP) Index:
If you see a pattern in my approach this year – you’re right – I’ll be working from worst to first excluding the eye-sore – Chivas USA. No point in my view – Wilbur Cabrera no doubt did the best job he could but since the organization is toast it’s best this black-eye of the MLS Franchise is laid to rest as quickly as possible.
Note that Houston (HDFC) finished third bottom in the Composite Index – pretty much meaning that both their attacking and defending team performance was weak.
The correlation (R2) of this Index to average points earned in MLS is .85.
Now for the Grist… points per game both home and away for Houston this year.
On the Road Houston averaged .65 Points per Game (PPG) 4th worst in MLS – at home 1.65 PPG 10th best in MLS.
Overall – Houston averaged 1.15 PPG – 6th worst in MLS.
So from a team performance standpoint – dead on average when it came to performing at home this year – the killer, in putting them near bottom, was their road performance.
When looking into the team performance indicators of PWP I’ll make it a special point to peel back home and away outputs. For now they had eight wins at home with three wins on the road.
It would appear that their inability to get a draw on the road was a stumbling block – just 2 draws to go with three wins – otherwise they lost 12 road games this year…
In those 12 road losses they scored just four goals, in their two road draws – they didn’t score any goals.
Even more pear-shaped is that four of their 12 goals, on the road, came in one game against Chivas USA! They simply didn’t get results on the road!
Can you say new strikers for next year?
Perhaps – but it’s not all about just striking the ball, there’s passing accuracy, penetration, and as things are beginning to show, patience…
Bottom line here, they really couldn’t score or win on the road…
Team Performance – first up – given their inability to score goals on the road – Attacking PWP:
Given just four goals scored in their 12 losses and only .71 Goals per Game, on the road as a whole – it shouldn’t be surprising that they fell that low in the Attacking PWP Index. Kind of makes you wonder about San Jose (2nd worst) and them bringing on Dominic Kinnear to turn that attacking ship around?!?
However viewed there’s six team performance indicators that make up this Index so were they all bad, across the board, or just in finishing?
Possession Percentage:
All told – 48.95% – (9th highest) with Home possession 50.61% and Road possession 47.34%.
Not enough information to really pick out if their home and road styles were different – but enough information to warrant a closer look at volume both inside and outside the final third.
The overall volume of passes offered up at home was 417 per game – while on the road 397 per game – about 20 passes per game fewer.
That 20 passes per game more, at Home, only translated to 6 more passes per game in the Attacking Final Third (117 at home vs 111 on the road).
Again – not a great difference so more data is needed.
Passing Accuracy:
All told – 76.54% – (11th highest) with Home accuracy 77.41% and Road accuracy 75.68%.
Overall their passing accuracy appeared to suffer on the road versus at home; but neither were particularly good compared to the rest of MLS.
We already know their volume of passes decreased on the road as well – so as their volume decreased their accuracy decreased.
That doesn’t usually follow but I think we saw that trait with Chicago as well – as volume decreased accuracy decreased…
For the Portland Timbers the opposite was true – as volume decreased accuracy increased.
So that relationship seems pretty pear-shaped to me…
I suppose there can be any number of reasons why this might occur – for me, I’d offer at least one observation – with decreased passing and decreased possession they may have been playing more difficult (longer) passes given less control of the game; i.e – showing less patience.
Penetration per Possession:
All told – 23.82% (5th highest) with Home penetration 24.38% and Road penetration 23.25%
For the most part, in doing this analysis for two years now – a higher percentage of penetration per possession is not that good with a lower passing accuracy percentage.
What that higher number appears to indicate is less patience (with lower overall passing accuracy) and with that less patience in penetration their is usually a corresponding increase in the volume of shots – but the accuracy of those shots is usually lower.
Which then translates to fewer shots on goal and fewer goals scored.
For now, I’d offer that Houston attempted to penetrate with more frequency compared to having less possession – some might say this indicates a more direct attacking style as well.
When looking at the percentage of passes completed, in the Final Third, the Dynamo were accurate 62.44% of the time on the road (7th worst), 67.43% at home (7th best) and 64.94% overall.
Given the lower passing accuracy, and lower volume, as we know from earlier, I’d offer the Dynamo looked to play more direct on the road, and slightly less direct at home.
Put another way (perhaps?) – they were less patient on the road than at home.
Shots Taken per Penetrating Possession:
All told – 18.83% (5th highest) with Home at 19.72% and Road at 17.93%
So 5th highest in both penetrating possession and shots taken per penetration.
As noted above then, the first two trends match other low performers – more penetration usually means more shots per penetration when passing accuracy is on the lower end of the scale.
What’s also interesting is that these last two indicators were lower for Road games than Home games.
And, at the same time, Home games saw the Dynamo more accurate in their passing.
Meaning, it’s likely there is more to their road attacking weakness than strikers; the question taking shape for me do those weaknesses also include lack of good midfielders, or worse yet, a completely pear-shaped away game tactical style?
Shots on Goal per Shots Taken:
We already know that the magic number for most teams, to win in the top leagues, is at least 5-6 Shots on Goal; (read here if not convinced).
For Houston they averaged 33.05% (2nd worst) in this category with Home 34.80% and Road 31.30%.
So the pattern of, less percentages from gaining possession, on-wards, means less percentages all the way through when the Dynamo are on the Road, compared to Home.
And with that percentage being 2nd worst in MLS it’s worthy to check what the average volumes are as well.
Shots Taken (13.29 – Home = 14.49 – Road = 11.65) 10th best overall.
Shots on Goal (4.53 – Home = 5.18 – Road = 3.88) 12th best overall.
Let’s not forget they won eight games at home – so that target of 5.18 seems reasonable.
A couple of things here – if it’s just strikers then chances are the target of 5.18 shots on goal at home is not reached and with 3.88 shots on goal on the road as well, it’s pretty likely that the – so I’d offer it’s more than just strikers.
Bottom line here; before looking at the Goals Scored I’d offer that the consistency in poor passing accuracy, overzealous approach in penetration and shot creation is down to poor midfield play and poor team tactics as opposed to just weaknesses in strikers.
Goals Scored per Shots on Goal:
With over 5.18 Shots on Goal per game at Home the Dynamo should have averaged over 2.00 goals per game – but they didn’t.
So for me that does mean strikers are also accountable for the poor attacking performance.
All told their team performance percentage was 22.14% – the worst in MLS. Home was 30.19% (8th worst) and Road was 14.08% – a full 16% points below the league average.
In summary:
They not only had poor performance when it came to striking (even at home their overall performance was below average) they were horrendous on the road.
Team road performance percentages (REGULARLY) were lower (in percentage and by volume) across the board, in every single category.
Clearly pointing, in my opinion, to a tactical strategy that was wrong – never-mind the perceived or real weaknesses in their strikers.
If Dominic Kinnear thinks he’s going to be able to take a failed tactical attacking road strategy, in the East, and expect to have it win out West (in a far tougher conference) he needs to rethink.
And San Jose really need to consider what investments will be needed to have Dominic Kinnear transform the 2nd worst attacking team in MLS, when their new Head Coach just completed a year in Houston where his tactical approach led to the third worst attacking team performance in MLS.
Now with those brutal thoughts out of the way for Attack – here’s how the Dynamo performed in Defending PWP:
Not quite as ugly on the defending side of the pitch – but still 6th worst, overall, in MLS.
Opponent Possession Percentage:
All told – 51.02% – we already know based upon their attacking possession percentage the opponent possessed the ball more often than the Dynamo.
That’s not a bad thing for some teams – New England, Vancouver, DC United, and FC Dallas all made the playoffs where the opponent possessed the ball more than they did.
In that, I’d offer the rubber will meet the road a bit later as we dig in on the defensive end.
Opponent Passing Accuracy:
All told 78.47% (4th highest) with Home 77.34% and Road 79.59%.
Not much to draw on without looking into some volumes – so Total Passes faced was 426.03 per game; 9th fewest in MLS – at Home opponents passed 401 times per game – versus when on the road – that number increased by almost 50 passes per game (448.94).
Pretty much indicating to me the Dynamo ceded possession as well as a considerably higher number of overall passes; especially when facing opponents on the road.
Still not enough to draw a conclusion, one way or the other, about weaker play or tactics.
Opponent Penetration per Possession:
All told – 22.19% (12th best) with Home 20.78% and Road 23.59%.
When playing on the Road the opponents (at home) penetrated roughly 3% more of the time than visiting Houston.
The percentage of passing within and into the Houston defending final third was 67.26% on the road and 62.68% at home.
More penetration by opponents when Houston played on the road and better accuracy for the opponents as well.
In considering the opponent volumes, the average number of passes, within and into the defending final third, was 112.65 per game.
Opponents visiting Houston averaged 102 per game. compared to 122.63 when Houston visited them.
An increase in volume by nearly 20 passes per game when on the road.
So far, that means both the volume and accuracy of the opponent, when entertaining Houston got better the closer they got to the Houston goal.
With that I’d expect Shots Taken per Penetrating Possession and Shots on Goals percentages to drop somewhat – reinforcing that as teams did gain penetration they were more likely to show more patience in shots taken – resulting in increased goals scored.
However viewed, I’d offer that the tactics on the road, against the opponent, were not the same as those employed at home. By volume alone, I’d offer that Houston played slightly higher up the pitch (defensively) at home, and slightly deeper on the road. My rationale for that comes after doing my analysis on Philadelphia and Portland this year – both teams showed these trends, in volume, and percentages, when playing deeper versus more shallow.
Opponent Shots Taken per Penetrating Possession:
All told 19.91% (4th worst) with Home 22.16% (2nd worst) and Road 17.67% (13th worst).
In other words the opponent’s were taking more shots per penetrating possession than opponents against other teams.
What’s interesting is that the percentage for opponents, when Houston played them on the road, dropped – in other words the opponents took fewer shots per penetrating possession.
This is an indicator that the opponents were more frugal with their shot selection – meaning, usually, they sought more time and space in order to increase the end results – accuracy in having shots on goal – score goals.
The higher percentage at Home could mean that the Dynamo were more likely to hurry their opponent into taking shots – with eight wins at home that shouldn’t be surprising.
However viewed, the trends indicating a different tactical approach, given opponent outputs, still continues to show itself in the data.
Opponent Shots on Goal per Shots Taken:
All told 34.90% (6th best) with Home 34.25% and Road 35.55%.
Their average volume of shots on goal, against, is 5th highest in MLS and the average Goals Against was 1.58 (6th highest in MLS).
So regardless of what tactic was employed the opponent’s were finding ways to put their shots on goal.
When on the road, the opponent averages 1.81 goals against Houston – 3rd worst (highest) in MLS.
Meaning, even with decreased shots taken (by percentage) and decreased shots on goal (by percentage) the opponents were pretty accurate.
So in the case of Houston, a perceived deeper line in defending (in away games) did not reduce goals against – it increased goals against.
So the tactic successfully employed by both Philadelphia and Portland did not pan out for Houston.
This could mean any number of things but I’d offer at least two thoughts; 1) the defensive tactic on the road was the wrong defensive tactic (all year), and 2) adding both a central midfielder and left fullback did not heal the wounds, meaning more player personnel moves are likely when viewing the defending side of the pitch. And yes, I did take a look to see if there were differences in volume or percentage from game one to game 34 – I didn’t see any either viewing the total or just away/home games.
In Closing:
I’d offer the move to change Head Coaches was probably going to happen even if Dominic Kinnear didn’t show his intentions of moving to San Jose.
I’d also offer there could be at least 4-6 new starters for this team next year. At least one new striker, two new midfielders, two new defenders, plus, we already know, there will be a new Goal Keeper.
I’d also offer there are indicators showing that the overall tactical approach, on the road, was pear-shaped – if Dominic Kinnear expects to use that same approach in San Jose, without some minor upgrades in players, compared to this year, he may have issues.
And he certainly needs to reconsider what road attacking style he adopts as well – with San Jose being 2nd worst in these same categories, across the board, he may have major goal scoring issues.
Finally, some teams seemed to have improved their goals against by playing deeper – while with Houston that does not appear to be the case. What appears to work for some, might not work for others; it’s a funny game this is.
Best, Chris
COPYRIGHT, All Rights Reserved. PWP – Trademark.